The question starts from a premise. The four real objections behind it are radioactive waste, accident risk, weapons proliferation and cost — here is the data for each:
Waste: spent fuel stays radioactive for thousands of years and is stored today in pools and dry casks at the plants themselves, because no country yet has a deep geological repository in operation. The most advanced project is Onkalo, in Finland: Finnish regulator STUK issued a favorable safety statement in August 2026 — a precondition for the operating licence — and Posiva is aiming to begin disposing of fuel before the end of 2026.
Accidents: between 1969 and 2000, OECD countries recorded zero nuclear accidents with five or more immediate deaths, against 0.157 deaths per GWyr for the coal chain and 0.085 for natural gas, per the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. The period's only severe accident, Chernobyl, caused 31 immediate deaths and estimates of between 9,000 and 33,000 long-term cancer deaths, per studies by the European Commission, the IAEA, the WHO and UNSCEAR.
Proliferation: enrichment and reprocessing technology is dual-use, civilian and military, which is why an international verification system exists for it: as of 31 December 2025 the IAEA had comprehensive safeguards agreements in force with 183 States and Additional Protocols with 144 States plus Euratom.
Cost: building a new reactor costs between USD 2,157 and USD 6,920 per kWe in OECD countries, and the first projects of each new reactor generation have suffered delays and cost overruns that the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency documented and attributed to weak supply chains and a lack of recent construction experience.
No country yet has a deep geological repository in operation, and those capital costs and construction timelines are real and documented.